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Arbitral Discovery of Non-Parties
Jason F. Darnall*
RichardBales"
I. INTRODUCTION
The discovery of relevant information is a vital part of arbitration, as it is with
any dispute resolution process. Parties in arbitration need to gather the relevant
information to present their best case to the arbitrator. Access to the relevant
information enables the arbitrator to better render a just decision. The Federal
Arbitration Act (hereinafter FAA), which authorizes specific enforcement of
arbitration agreements,' also contains language dealing with the power of arbitrators
to order discovery.2 This language gives force to the arbitrator's discovery orders,
whereas otherwise there would be none.
The federal courts are, however, split regarding the scope of these powers when
one party seeks discovery of a non-party. 3 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York have limited
arbitrators' power to compel non-party participation to the actual hearing. On the
other hand, three federal district courts give arbitrators broad discovery powers,
including the ability to compel non-parties to participate in pre-hearing discovery.
This article argues that the broad power approach is the better reasoned of the
two. Timely discovery of important information is vital in any dispute. Further, fair
results should be the goal of any dispute resolution process. The possessor of the
pertinent information, i.e., whether it is held by parties or non-parties, should be
irrelevant.
Part II of this article describes the differences between discovery in litigation
and discovery in arbitration. Part III examines the limited power approach to prehearing discovery, which restricts the power of an arbitrator to compel non-party
participation in discovery to the actual hearing. Part IV examines the broad power
approach, which gives arbitrators the power to compel non-parties to participate in
pre-hearing discovery. Part V analyzes each approach, highlighting the weaknesses
of the limited power approach and the strengths of the broad power approach. Part
VI proposes that courts adopt the broad power approach. Recognizing, however,
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1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).

2. Id.
§ 7.
165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999)
3. See generally Nail. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co.. Inc.,
(noting but not resolving the split of authority); Am. Fedn. of Television & Radio Artists, AFL-CIO v.
WJBK-TV,164 F.3d 1004, 1009 n.7 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting, but not resolving, the issue); Robert E.
Benson, The Power ofArbitrators and Courts to Order Discovery inArbitration, 25 Colo. Law. 55, 59
(1996); Teresa Snider, The Discovery Powers of Arbitrators and Federal Courts Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 34 Tort & Ins. L.J. 101, 114 (1998); Charlotte Warr et al., Recent Developments in
International Tort and Insurance Law and Practice,35 Tort & Ins. L.J. 435, 454 (2000).
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that the advantages of arbitration over litigation derive in large part from the
curtailing of discovery, Part VI also proposes that arbitrators be given the discretion
to limit non-party discovery as they deem appropriate.
II. BACKGROUND
The discovery powers of the courts in conventional litigation and the powers of
arbitrators are very different. Parties to a civil suit in federal court are afforded
broad discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Conversely, with
arbitration, broad discovery is less certain since arbitral rules are contractual and are
established by the parties themselves. The discovery powers of the courts, and the
discovery powers of arbitrators, are discussed in turn.
A. Discovery Powers of the Courts in Litigation
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure control the process of discovery in all civil
trials in the federal courts.4 One goal of these Rules is to provide for broad
discovery. 5 The United States Supreme Court endorsed broad discovery in the case
of Hickman v. Taylor,6 as illustrated by the oft quoted language of Justice Murphy:
"Civil trials no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear for the
parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and the facts before
trial."7 Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation."
An important component of the availability of broad discovery powers is the
ability of the parties (through the courts) to compel pre-trial, non-party participation.
Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of any information relevant to the claim or defense
of a case that is not privileged. 9 Rule 30(b)(1) allows the parties to schedule
depositions upon providing reasonable notice.' ° Rule 45 permits a party to compel
a non-party to participate in these depositions through the use of subpoenas."
Further, Rule 30(b)(5) allows parties to compel non-parties to provide any pertinent
documents they might have in their possession.' 2 These non-party discovery orders
are enforced with the full power of the court. The failure of a non-party to
participate in discovery can lead to that non-party being in contempt of court, and
subject to various penalties. 3

4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (2001).
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2001).
6. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
7. Id. at 501.
8. Id. at 506. See e.g. Roebling v. Anderson, 257 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Crowe v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 29 F.R.D. 148,150 (E.D. Mich. 1961); US. v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66,72 (9th
Cir. 1968) (quoting the policy of broad discovery endorsed in Hickman).
9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1) (2001).
ii. Fed. R. Civ. P.45 (2001).
12. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(5).
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e).
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These broad discovery powers are illustrated by the case of Truswal Systems
Corporationv. Hydro-Air Engineering,Inc. 4 Truswal sued Gang-Nails Systems
for infringement on Truswal's patent." Truswal accused Hydro-Air of the same
infringements, but could not sue Hydro-Air in its case against Gang-Nails because
of venue statutes. 6 Part of Truswal's pre-trial discovery involved a court-issued
subpoena asking that Hydro-Air designate a spokesperson to testify, and also to
produce documents." Hydro-Air moved to quash on ground that the request was
unlikely to result in the discovery of pertinent information in Truswal's suit against
Gang-Nails.18 The Eighth Circuit, affirming the trial court's discovery order, ruled
that in cases where the relevance of the evidence may be in doubt, all doubts should
be resolved in favor of disclosure.' 9
In addition to providing for broad discovery of parties and non-parties alike, the
Rules also contain procedural safeguards designed to protect non-parties from overly
burdensome discovery. Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) requires that subpoenas to non-parties
be quashed if they impose undue burdens regarding the time and expense involved
in travel.2" Similarly, Rule 26(c) provides the courts with ample discretion to
balance competing interests, such as burden on the non-party and availability of
information elsewhere. Protective orders can be issued by the court to protect the
non-party if necessary. 2' In some cases, Rule 26(c)(2) gives the courts the power to
22
compel the party seeking discovery to reimburse the non-party for expenses.
The Hydro-Air case and the Federal Rules themselves reflect the broad power
approach federal courts consistently take with regard to pre-trial discovery of nonparties. Unlike conventional litigation however, arbitration is contractual as well as
statutory. Therefore, the rules governing discovery in arbitration are likely to vary
with each case.23

14. 813 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1987).
15. Id. at 1208.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1212. See e.g. Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus. Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1024 (4th Cir.
1986) (explaining that relevance is a broader term when dealing with discovery matters as compared to
relevance for trial and stating that where relevance is in doubt, courts should be permissive in allowing
the discovery); Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 566 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpreting
the federal rules governing discovery as permitting the broadest possible scope of discovery).
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2).
23. See Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Intl., 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[Als a
creature of contract, both the substance and procedure for arbitration can be agreed upon in advance. The
parties may pre-arrange discovery mechanisms directly or by selecting an established forum or body of
governing principles in which the conventions of discovery are settled").
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B. Discovery Powers of Arbitrators
In arbitration, the parties themselves are allowed to set the rules concerning the
discovery phase of the dispute." The case of Williams v. Kattin is an example. 25 In
Williams, the appellant sought to vacate an arbitrator's award. 26 The appellant
sought to do so on the basis that the arbitrator erroneously deprived her of the right
to discover relevant information. 7 The Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois disagreed, noting that American Arbitration Association rules
governing discovery had been incorporated into the arbitration agreement.28 Those
rules allow arbitrators to subpoena witnesses and documents, but leave the scope of
discovery to the arbitrator's discretion.2 9 The mere fact that Williams was not able
to discover information she had hoped for was irrelevant.30 A consequence of the
arbitration agreement was that the parties had "traded" the guarantees of
conventional discovery for the expedience of arbitration.3
The nature of arbitration is thus contractual. Parties to arbitration agree between
themselves what the ground rules will be.32 The power of discovery given to an
arbitrator is limited to those powers given by the parties. Obviously, non-parties are
not bound by this agreement. The arbitrator's power over non-parties must therefore
come from another source.
The power to compel non-party participation is derived from the FAA.33 The
FAA attempts to preserve the contractual nature of arbitration. In addition to
providing the baseline legal rules governing arbitration, the statute governs in areas
where the parties have failed to agree, or where the agreement would be ineffective
without assistance from the courts. 34 Since non-parties are not bound by the
underlying arbitration agreement, an arbitrator has no power to compel non-party
participation in discovery absent authority derived from the FAA.35
The FAA, in addition to applying in the federal court system, also applies in
state courts.36 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the intended scope of the FAA.37 The Court referred to its holding

24. See Amgen, Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Delaware County, Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878, 883 (N.D. 111.1995).
Dec. 9, 1996).
25. 1996 WL 717447 (N.D. 111.
26. Id. at *2.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *4.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 883.
33. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16; see COMSATv. Natl. Science Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 1999).
34. Benson, supra n. 3, at 55.
35. COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 275.
36. See e.g. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,Fenner,& Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 405 S.2d 790,793 (Fla. App.
1981); R. J. PalmerConst. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 642 P.2d 127, 129 (Kan. App. 1982)
("The Federal Arbitration Act applies in state courts as well as federal, and the act requires state courts
to enforce an applicable arbitration clause despite contrary state law or policy").
37. 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)); see Allied Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (holding that the language in the FAA enforcing
written arbitration provision in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce," was written
broadly extending the FAA's reach to the far limits of Congress' commerce clause power). See also 9
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in Southland Corp. v. Keating, stating that "Congress intended the FAA to apply in
state courts, and to preempt state anti-arbitration laws to the contrary."'38 It is evident
then that not only is the FAA applicable to the state courts, but state laws contrary
to the objective of the FAA are preempted.39 The FAA's impact is therefore farreaching.
Section 7 of the FAA provides, "the arbitrators selected ... may summon in
writing any person to attend before them... and in a proper case to bring with him
or them any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed material as
evidence in the case."40 Courts agree that this language confers authority only on
arbitrators; the parties to an arbitration agreement may not use this provision to
subpoena documents or witnesses. 4
Most courts agree that arbitrators may compel non-party participation in
discovery at the actual hearing.42 The federal courts are, however, split when it
comes to the power of an arbitrator to compel non-party participation in discovery
before the hearing. Some courts take a limited power approach, exemplified by
COMSAT.43 Other courts take a broad power approach, as in Stanton v. Paine
Webber Jackson & Curtis Inc." The two approaches are discussed in turn.
III. THE LIMITED POWER APPROACH TO ARBITRAL DISCOVERY
The courts adhering to the limited power approach provide two basic rationales
for their decisions. One rationale is based on a textual interpretation of the FAA.
The second rationale is based on contract law principles. The two rationales are
discussed in sequence.

U.S.C. § 1.
38. Adams, 121 S. Ct. at 1305 (citing SouthlandCorp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1).
39. Id.
40. 9 U.S.C. § 7.
41. Natl. Broad.Co. v.Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing section
seven of the FAA from 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1994)); Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980)
("While an arbitration panel may subpoena documents or witnesses, the litigating parties have no
comparable privilege"); Beth H. Friedman, The Preclusive Effect of Arbitral Determinations in
Subsequent Federal Securities Litigation, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 655, 672 n.126 (1987) ("While an
arbitration panel has the power to subpoena documents or witnesses, the parties to the arbitration lack the
advantage of discovery").
42. See generally COMSA T, 190 F.3d at 276 (limiting arbitrator's power over non-parties to the actual
appearance before the arbitrators); In re Arb. Brazell, 2000 WL 364997 at *I (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2000)
(distinguishing the availability of discovery on non-parties before the arbitration hearing and at the
arbitration hearing); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69,73 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(limiting the compelling of the presence of non-party witnesses to the actual hearing); Meadows Indem.
Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42, 44 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (explaining that arbitrator could clearly
compel non-parties to appear or produce documents at the hearing).
43. COMSAT, 190 F.3d 269.
44. 685 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
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A. The Textual Rationale
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York have adhered to this limited power approach
concerning the subpoena powers of arbitrators. In COMSA T, the plaintiff COMSAT
contracted with Associated Universities, Incorporated (AUI), to build a state-of-the
art telescope for AUI.45 The National Science Foundation (NSF) was a government
sponsor of AUI's research projects.46 A dispute arose between COMSAT and AUI
regarding unexpected costs associated with the telescope.47 There was a mandatory
arbitration clause between COMSAT and AUI. 4" Before the hearing and at
COMSAT's request, the arbitrator subpoenaed
49 NSF requesting documents related
to the telescope, but NSF refused to comply.
Following NSF's refusal to comply, COMSAT petitioned the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to compel NSF to produce the
requested documents. 5° The district court interpreted the FAA as granting broad
powers of discovery to arbitrators." Further, NSF had failed to seek judicial relief
from the subpoenas in a timely manner. 2 The district court ruled in favor of
COMSAT and ordered NSF to comply. NSF then appealed?.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held the subpoena powers of
an arbitrator should be strictly limited to those explicitly provided in the FAA. The
court emphasized section seven of the FAA, which provides that "[a]rbitrators...
may summon in writing any person to appear before them.., as a witness... and
to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which may be
deemed material." 4 According to the Fourth Circuit, the words "before them" meant
before the arbitrator at the hearing, and not during any pre-hearing discovery."
Coupling this language along with the absence of any expressly stated authority to
compel pre-hearing discovery on non-parties, the Fourth Circuit limited the
arbitrator's power over non-parties to the actual hearing.56
In addition to the textualist reading the Fourth Circuit gave to the FAA, the court
offered another reason as to why the power should be limited. The court concluded
that parties in arbitration have essentially waived their right to rely on the discovery
devices available in conventional litigation.57 This is part of the price the parties paid
in exchange for a less expensive and more efficient means of dispute resolution.B
Often, discovery can be very lengthy and expensive, which is contrary to the purpose

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 272.
Id. at 271.
Id.at 272.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 276.
Id.
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of arbitration.59 The court therefore concluded that neither party to an arbitration
agreement may expect full-blown discovery from third parties, or even from each
other, in arbitration. 60
The Fourth Circuit did not, however, impose a blanket rule prohibiting nonparty discovery in arbitration. Instead, the court stated that there could be cases
where "special needs" would require an exception to the general rule prohibiting
discovery. 6' In these cases, the Fourth Circuit stated, the party seeking discovery
should petition the district court for a discovery subpoena. The Fourth Circuit did
not attempt to define what might constitute a special need, but noted that at an
absolute minimum, a party would need to show an inability to get that information
elsewhere. 62 The court did not explain what, if anything, else would have to be
shown to meet the "special needs" exception.
B. The ContractRationale
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York offered an
additional rationale for the limited power approach. In Integrity Insurance Co. v.
American CentennialInsuranceCo., the court looked to the contractual nature of the
arbitration proceeding.63 Since non-parties never bargained for the arbitration
agreement, nor agreed to participate in the arbitration proceedings, the non-parties
should not be compelled to participate in pre-hearing discovery. 64 The parties
themselves could not compel non-parties to participate, and likewise they could not
grant that power to the arbitrator. 6' The arbitrator's discovery power over nonparties is therefore derived exclusively from the FAA, which, according to this court,
limits that power to the arbitration hearing. 66
The Integritycourt was also fearful ofpotential harassing and abusive discovery
on non-parties. 67 Pre-hearing depositions would not be held in the presence of the
arbitrator, whereas testimony presented at the hearing permits the arbitrator to
protect the interests of the non-party and serve as a "check" on the two sides.68 If a
non-party felt harassed at a pre-hearing deposition, the party likely would look to the
courts for relief.69 This, reasoned the court, would defeat the purpose of arbitration,
which is to resolve the dispute outside of the courtroom.7" The court then concluded
that pre-hearing depositions of non-parties should not be permitted in arbitration
proceedings.
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, however, the Integrity court permitted pre-hearing
paperdiscovery from non-parties. The court distinguished what would be involved

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
885 F. Supp. 69,73 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id.at 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in compelling non-parties to submit to depositions, from that of ordering non-parties
to produce pertinent documents.' The court stated that a document would only have
to be produced once, whereas a deposition requiring the non-party's presence might
need to be taken on more than one occasion. 2 The difference lay in the potential
burden on the non-party.73 The rule then in the Southern District of New York seems
to be that arbitrators may compel non-parties to provide documents prior to a
hearing, but may not order non-parties to submit to depositions.7
At least one legal scholar, Robert Benson, has criticized this distinction. Benson
has pointed out that nothing in the FAA authorizes either the compelled attendance
75
of non-parties or the production of documents prior to the actual hearing. He
argues that if the Fourth Circuit's textualist interpretation is to be applied
76
consistently, neither depositions nor document productions should be permitted.
The courts adopting the limited power approach have left arbitrators with little
discovery power over non-parties. If information is held by non-parties, compelled
discovery will have to wait until the scheduled hearing. However, not all federal
courts have interpreted the FAA this way.
IV. THE BROAD POWER APPROACH TO ARBITRAL DISCOVERY
In contrast to the limited power courts, other courts have given arbitrators much
more freedom in compelling non-party participation in discovery. Three federal
district courts have adopted the broad power approach when it comes to the
availability ofpre-hearing discovery. In these jurisdictions, discovery of information
held by non-parties is not limited to the actual hearing.
A. Deference to Arbitrator'sDiscretion
The broad power approach is exemplified by the case of Stanton v. Paine
Webber Jackson & Curtis Inc. 7 7 In that case, Richard Stanton sued various
defendants alleging violations of the Commodities Exchange Act and other securities
laws.78 Upon a motion filed by the defendants, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida ordered arbitration pursuant to the FAA and an

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See In reArb. Brazell, 2000 WL 364997 at *3 (permitting pre-hearing document production ofnonparty); but see In re Application of Medway Power Ltd., 985 F. Supp. 402, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(implying in dicta that document production of non-parties would not be available in American arbitration
proceedings); Frenkel v. Old Dominion DairyProds. Inc., 398 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817, 91 Misc.2d 849,851
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (denying pre-hearing deposition of non-party because state law standard, which
permitted discovery in aid of arbitration "only upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances," had not
been met); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Beneficial Corp., 1987 WL 17951 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1987)
(stating in dicta that the FAA gives arbitrators "a subpoena power which extends overnon-parties as well
as parties, and may in appropriate circumstances compel the production of documents and discovery").
75. Benson, supra n. 3, at 58.
76. Id.
77. 685 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
78. Id. at 1242.
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arbitration agreement the parties had signed. 9 The various defendants then
requested documents from non-parties before the hearing, hoping the documents
would disprove Stanton's allegations.8" Stanton then sought an injunction to prevent
this discovery, claiming that the FAA limited discovery on non-parties to the actual
hearing. 8
The district court denied Stanton's request for an injunction and held that an
arbitrator "may order and conduct such discovery as [the arbitrator] fmnd[s]
necessary." 82 The court rejected Stanton's contention that arbitrators were limited
under the FAA to compelling non-party participation at the hearing, saying that such
an allegation was "unfounded. 8 3 Unfortunately, the district court gave no reasons
as to exactly why it was unfounded.
The court did, however, give strong weight to the overall purpose of the FAA.
The purpose of the arbitration was to "facilitate and expedite the resolution of
disputes, ease court congestion, and provide disputants with a less costly alternative
to litigation. 8 4 The court reasoned, therefore, that judicial control over the
proceedings should be kept to a minimum. 5
B. Textualist Inference of BroadPowers
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
conferred broad powers on arbitrators in the case of Meadows Indemnity Co. v.
Nutmeg Ins. Co. 6 In addition to citing Stanton as authority, the court offered two
additional rationales.8 7 First, the court found that non-party discovery was vital for
the arbitrator to be able to make a full and fair determination of the issues in the
dispute. 8 Second, the court held that because the arbitrator had the statutory
authority to compel non-parties to appear or produce documents at the hearing, the
arbitrator implicitly had the power to do the same prior to the hearing through
discovery. 9 This court also expressed a willingness to defer to the arbitrator's
judgment in weighing the potential burdens and benefits of pre-hearing discovery.90
The Meadows decision illustrates the three key issues that divide the broadpower courts from the limited-power courts. The first is that the broad-power courts
consider broad discovery an integral part of a fair dispute resolution process; the
limited-power courts see discovery as less important. Second, the broad-power
courts interpret section seven of the FAA as permitting arbitrators to order non-party

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. See also Miss. Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 69 F.R.D. 558, 564 (S.D. Miss. 1976)
(explaining that arbitrators may, in their discretion, permit and supervise discovery as they deem
appropriate).
83. Stanton, 685 F. Supp. at 1243.
84. Id. at 1242.
85. Id.
86. 157 F.R.D. 42 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
87. Id. at 45.
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 44-45.
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discovery; the limited-power courts interpret section seven as prohibiting arbitrators
from ordering such discovery. Third, the broad-power courts express confidence in
arbitrators' ability to balance the need for non-party discovery against the arbitral
goal of resolving disputes quickly and inexpensively; the limited-power courts
assume that by permitting non-party discovery, arbitration will devolve into the very
process (litigation) that it was designed to replace.
C. BroadDiscovery by Agreement
Still another example of broad discovery of non-parties in arbitration is found
in Amgen, from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.9
The parties in this case had signed an arbitration agreement and had agreed that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would govern the arbitral discovery process. 92 The
court held that the parties had agreed to the broad discovery requirements of the
Federal Rules, including the provisions permitting non-party discovery. The court
cited both Stanton and Meadows in its opinion and concluded that the FAA permits
an arbitrator to compel non-party participation in pre-hearing discovery. 93 Since the
language of the FAA permitted pre-hearing discovery, and because the Federal Rules
provided for a policy of broad discovery, the arbitrator's subpoenas to the nonparties were valid and enforceable. 94
The rationale of these courts indicates a willingness to defer to the judgment of
the arbitrator in ordering the proper amount ofdiscovery. 95 Information held by nonparties that is deemed relevant by the arbitrator should be discoverable to ensure fair
outcomes. These courts see the arbitrators as capable decision-makers when it
comes to weighing the benefits versus the burdens of non-party discovery. 96
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICTING APPROACHES
The main difference between the two approaches of the circuits seems to be a
difference in interpreting section seven of the FAA. Some courts have strictly
limited the words "before them" to mean that non-parties can be compelled to
participate in discovery only at the arbitration hearing. Pre-hearing discovery of
non-parties therefore is limited or nonexistent. Other courts have allowed broad
discovery based upon implied authority within the FAA. This latter group of
decisions permits arbitrators to make informed judgments about what discovery is
necessary for a fair result. If a non-party holds that information, the information is
discoverable at or before the hearing.

91. 879 F. Supp. 878.
92. Id. at 881 n. 2.
93. Id. at 880.
94. Id.
95. See Stanton, 685 F. Supp. at 1242 (explaining thatjudicial interference with arbitrator's decisions
would undermine the purposes of arbitration which is a quick resolution of the dispute); Meadows, 157
F.R.D. at 45 (holding that arbitrator's discovery orders on non-parties was entirely reasonable and saying
that such orders must be enforced or else risk hampering the arbitrator's ability to deal with complex
cases).
96. See Stanton, 685 F. Supp. at 1242;Meadows, 157 F.R.D. at 45.
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Of the two approaches, the broad-power approach is the better reasoned. As the
Stanton court stated, the purpose of arbitration is to provide a quick, efficient, and
fair resolution of disputes.97 An important element of fairness is that the parties
should have the ability to discover the important information regarding the case.
A. Weaknesses of the Limited Power Approach
There are three weaknesses of the limited-power approach. First, it
compromises the ability of arbitration to result in fair outcomes because it denies
parties the ability to discover facts before the hearing that may be essential to
preparing and proving their case. Imagine a dispute involving the most elementary
set of facts, such as a routine fender-bender accident. Assume further that an injured
party has brought an action against the insurance company of the negligent driver.
In a situation such as this, key witnesses need to be deposed as soon as possible
while the facts of the accident are still fresh in their minds. Forcing the parties to
delay deposing their witnesses might jeopardize the effectiveness and credibility of
that testimony. The inability to depose key witnesses prior to a hearing could
hamper either party's chance of a fair result. For example, in Armendariz v.
Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., the California Supreme Court held that
implicit in an arbitration agreement is an agreement to such discovery as may be
necessary to adequately arbitrate the claim.98
Second, the contract theory rationale of the limited-power approach is suspect.
Although it is true that non-parties did not agree to become a part of the arbitration
agreement, it is equally true that most non-parties are reluctant participants in
conventional litigation under the Federal Rules. Further, were it not for the
arbitration agreement, the dispute likely would be litigated, and the non-parties
would be subject to the extremely broad discovery permitted by the federal and state
rules of civil procedure. The non-parties will experience no more of a burden in prearbitration discovery than they would if they had been compelled to participate in
pre-litigation discovery. If anything, the non-parties will experience less of a burden
in arbitration due to the fact that arbitrators have the discretion to exclude discovery
of information that is only marginally relevant and/or particularly burdensome to
produce.
Third, proponents of the limited-power approach might argue that since
subpoenas may be issued in cases where the information held by a non-party is
absolutely necessary, unfair results are less likely. Yet, the courts adhering to this
approach have provided little guidance as to exactly what is required to show such
a hardship. For example, in COMSA T, the Fourth Circuit stated that at a minimum,
a party would need to show an inability to get that information elsewhere. 99 The
court did not explain what would be required in addition to this requirement.' °°

97. Stanton, 685 F. Supp. at 1242.
98. 6 P.3d 669, 683-84 (Cal. 2000). For a thorough discussion of this case, see S. Kathleen Isbell,
Student Author, Compulsory Arbitrationof Employment Agreements: Beneficient Shield or Sword of
Oppression? Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 22 Whittier L. Rev. 1107
(2001).
99. COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 276.
100. Id.
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Moreover, requiring the party to petition a court before seeking to compel discovery
defeats the purpose and expediency of the out-of-court dispute resolution process to
which the parties contractually agreed.
B. Strengths of the Broad PowerApproach
For the same reasons as to why the limited power approach is susceptible to
unjust results, the broad-power approach is better suited to avoid those results. First,
the broad-power approach promotes substantively fair outcomes. Applied to the
hypothetical car accident, upon selecting an arbitrator, each party would be
immediately able to gather important information. Witnesses could be deposed
while the details of the accident were still fresh in the witnesses' minds. As more
accurate information is made available, the chances of a fair result and ultimately the
chances of settlement, are increased.
Second, in some cases, deposing before the hearing might actually prove to be
less burdensome for the non-parties. For example, the parties could arrange the
depositions to take place at a time that is more convenient for the non-parties, and
the parties could agree that depositions would be used at the hearing in lieu of live
testimony. One can imagine any number of reasons why setting a hearing date that
suits everyone's schedule could be difficult. Depositions could be scheduled at the
witnesses' convenience, helping to alleviate this problem.
Third, increased discovery promotes settlement by enhancing the parties' ability
to predict the arbitrator's ultimate decision. For example, if the evidence adduced
through discovery strongly favors one party or the other, then the parties can go into
the actual hearing with reasonable expectations of the outcome. George L. Priest
and Benjamin Klein have concluded that litigation rates are higher when decisional
uncertainty is greater.°1' When the parties agree upon the likely outcome of a case,
they are likely to settle to save court costs. 2 Conversely, if the parties do not find
out until the arbitration hearing what the key witnesses will say, they will not be able
to predict the outcome and therefore are less likely to settle.
Fourth, the broad-power approach permits the parties to present their case most
effectively to the arbitrator. This is unlikely to occur when the parties do not know
until the hearing what the key witnesses will say. Permitting limited pre-hearing
discovery from key witnesses gives the parties a chance to organize the material in
a way to present their best argument to the arbitrator. If a party believes its best
arguments were presented, the party is more likely to perceive the ultimate result as
being fair.
Fifth, the broad-power approach is consistent with the parties' agreement to
submit the case to the authority of the arbitrator. For example, in National Post
Office v. U S. Postal Service,' ° a case decided under section 301 of the Labor

101. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J. Leg. Stud. 1
(1984).

102. Id.
103. 751 F.2d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Management Relations Act'0 4 rather than the FAA, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that when a labor arbitrator is construing a collective bargaining
agreement, "an arbitrator's judgment as to whether evidence is or is not relevant to
his determination is part of the bargain, and a court's power to disturb such
discretionary determinations is quite limited."' 05 Similarly, parties in civil arbitration
have contracted for the judgment of the arbitrator they have selected. Thisjudgment
should extend to the issue of whether non-party discovery is appropriate. The courts
should be reluctant to interfere with the judgment of the arbitrator that the parties
themselves have selected.
Sixth, the rationale for the broad power approach is supported by language in
several arbitration cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. Implicit in the
limited-power approach is the assumption that arbitrators are not capable of
controlling discovery in a way that both promotes the substantive outcomes of cases
and preserves the cost and time advantages of arbitration over litigation. By
contrast, the broad-power approach assumes that arbitrators are capable of, and
should be given the authority to do, just that.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have indicated the Court's
overwhelming confidence in the competence of arbitrators. In Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,' °6 the issue before the Court was the
enforceability of an arbitration clause to a claim arising under the Sherman Antitrust
Act. The party urging non-enforcement argued that arbitrators were not competent
to decide statutory claims. The Supreme Court disagreed, and enforced the
arbitration clause. The Court stated: "We are well past the time when judicial
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals
inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution."' 07 Similarly, in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., the Supreme
Court quoted Mitsubishiwith approval, and noted that the historical "'mistrust of the
arbitral process' has been undermined by our recent arbitration decisions.
One potential drawback of giving arbitrators the power to permit non-party
discovery is that it will lead to an increased role of the judiciary in arbitration
proceedings. Recall that section seven of the FAA provides that an arbitrator's
subpoenas are enforceable in federal district courts.'09 If parties opposing discovery,
or non-parties from whom discovery is sought, routinely challenge arbitral
subpoenas related to discovery, then federal district courts must be called upon to
enforce the subpoenas." 0
The solution, however, is for courts to give arbitrators wide discretion in the
decision of whether to authorize non-party discovery. As the National Post Office
case discussed above illustrates, courts currently give arbitrators wide discretion

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
Nal. Post Off., 751 F.2d at 841.
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
Id. at 626-27.
500 U.S. 20,34 n. 5 (1991).
9 U.S.C. § 7.
Id.
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concerning the admissibility of evidence."' Arbitral decisions on this issue are
rarely challenged in court. This is because courts invariably affirm arbitral
decisions, on the theory that the parties bargained for and received an arbitral, not
a judicial, determination of the issue. The same should be true for issues involving
non-party discovery.
A second potential drawback to the broad-power approach is that expanding the
availability of arbitral discovery increases cost and delay, and thereby obviates the
purpose and advantages of arbitration. Again, however, the solution is to give the
arbitrator the discretion to determine whether non-party discovery is warranted in a
particular case. Professor Martin Malin, discussing the availability of arbitral
discovery between parties, has pointed out that market forces serve as a check on
arbitral discovery: an arbitrator who lets discovery get out of control will frustrate
counsel for both parties and will not receive future appointments." 2 The same is true
for non-party discovery.
C. The Importance of FairResults
The hypothetical fact pattern of the car accident is very simple, but it shows how
a lack of pre-hearing non-party discovery could possibly result in unfair outcomes.
Such results are bad enough for the parties involved, but the consequences do not
stop there. Successful arbitration proceedings are vital to an already backlogged
court system. If all of the relevant information were made available, parties would
be more inclined to perceive that the results were fair and accept the outcome.
Conversely, if a party were denied access to facts that the party believed were crucial
to her case, the party is more likely to turn to the courts for relief thereby
undermining the purpose of arbitration. Similarly, ifthe courts begin to perceive that
arbitration is not reaching fair results, they may become less willing to enforce
arbitration agreements." 3
It seems counter-intuitive to say there is a need for out-of-court dispute
resolution and then expect it to be done effectively without crucial information.
Even with the exceptions that are allowed in cases of hardships, the limited-power
approach leaves too much room for the possibility of the exclusion of key evidence.
Granted, the broad-power approach does not allow for the discovery that one would
have available in litigation. Nonetheless, it does allow the parties to decide what
information they need, obtain that information, and organize it in preparation for the

111. Natt.Post Off., 751 F.2d at 841; see Frank Elkouri & EdnaAsper Elkouri, HowArbitrationWorks
403-06 (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed., BNA Books 1997).
112. Martin H. Malin, PrivatizingJustice- But By How Much? Questions Gilmer DidNot Answer,
16 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 589, 614-15 (2001).
113. See e.g. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing to enforce
arbitration agreement that gave to one party the unilateral authority to select the pool from which the
arbitrator would be chosen); Prevot v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 937 (S.D. Tex. 2001)
(refusing to enforce arbitration agreement written in English that had been signed by employees who
could not read English and who were not provided with translations of the document); see also Richard
A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical Guide to Designing and
Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 Baylor L. Rev. 591, 605 (1995).
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hearing. Important information is then less likely to be jeopardized because of time
restraints.
At a broader level, the Supreme Court's arbitration cases over the last fifteen
years indicate the Court's approval of arbitration as a substitute for litigation." 4
When arbitration procedures suffice to create a fair outcome, arbitration offers a
myriad of advantages over litigation, including cost and time savings, the possibility
of resolving the dispute while preserving an amicable relationship between the
parties, and access to justice for those who are unable to afford litigation." 5 These
advantages will prove fruitless, however, if arbitration procedures are perceived as
inadequate to ensure the fair substantive outcome of cases: parties will refuse to sign
arbitration agreements, courts will refuse to enforce the agreements that are signed,
11 6
and Congress may amend the FAA to make access to arbitration more restrictive.
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR ARBITRAL DISCRETION
The authors of this article believe that the broad discovery approach discussed
in Part IV is the better approach. The authors also recognize that the principal
advantages of arbitration - quick resolution and low cost - would be undermined by
discovery as extensive as discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Therefore, this article argues that the broad discovery approach should be tempered
in two respects.
First, the arbitrator should have the discretion to refuse discovery of facts that
are only marginally relevant, that can await discovery until the arbitration hearing
itself, or that would be particularly burdensome to the non-parties. Discovery in
arbitration should not be as extensive as discovery in litigation or many of the
advantages of arbitration will be lost. The arbitrator is in the best position to balance
the discovery needs of the parties, the integrity of the arbitration process itself, and
the relative burdens of discovery on non-parties. Consequently, the arbitrator should
have the discretion to limit non-party discovery as the arbitrator deems appropriate.
Second, the arbitrator should have the authority to shift the cost of discovery
from the non-parties to either the party seeking discovery or to all the parties
collectively. This would have the salutary effect of protecting non-parties from
overly-burdensome discovery, and of discouraging the parties from engaging in
excessive discovery.
The benefits of this proposal can be seen by applying it to the hypothetical car
accident. First, immediately after the accident, the attorneys for each side would
confer with the parties and determine which of the witnesses are the most important.
The short list of witnesses and topics of questioning would then be submitted to the
arbitrator for his or her approval. The arbitrator, after determining the relevance of
the information sought, would rule on which witnesses could be deposed and on the

114. In addition to the Mitsubishi and Gilmercases discussed above, see also Adams, 532 U.S. 105;
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
115. See Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration:The GrandExperiment in Employment (Comell
U. Press 1997) (discussing the advantages of arbitration in the employment context).
116. See generally Rick Bales & Reagan Burch, The Future of Employment Arbitration in the
Nonunion Sector, 45 Lab. L.J. 627, 634-35 (1994) (discussing employment arbitration).
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scope of each deposition. A date could be set convenient for all of the parties, and
the depositions would then be taken. Finally, the parties could find a mutually
convenient date and schedule depositions.
This entire "approval" process could be completed in a brief amount of time,
allowing each side to depose their witnesses as soon as possible. Upon obtaining the
necessary information, each side has a chance to organize the material, weed out the
unimportant information, and present their best case to the arbitrator. The arbitrator,
confident that the parties have had ample time to gather the evidence they need, can
render a decision based upon the facts presented.
VII. CONCLUSION
Federal courts currently are divided over whether arbitrators have the authority
to authorize pre-hearing discovery of non-parties. One group of courts holds that
arbitrators do not. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York has held that arbitrators may authorize pre-hearing document production, but
not pre-hearing depositions. Another group of courts has held that arbitrators have
the discretion to authorize all types of pre-hearing discovery from non-parties.
This article argues that arbitrators should have the discretion to authorize all
types of pre-hearing discovery from non-parties. This approach is consistent with
the language and the purpose of the FAA. It promotes substantively fair outcomes
by enabling the parties to better organize their cases. It promotes settlement by
enhancing the parties' ability to predict the ultimate outcome of the case. It is
consistent with the parties' agreement to submit the case to the authority of the
arbitrator. Finally, it is consistent with the Supreme Court's endorsement of
arbitration as a dispute resolution process and the Court's overwhelming confidence
in the competence of arbitrators.
Perhaps most importantly, third-party discovery preserves party confidence in
the arbitral process. A party is unlikely to perceive the arbitration process as fair if
she is surprised at the arbitral hearing by evidence to which she did not have prehearing access, particularly if that surprise impairs her ability to effectively present
her case to the arbitrator. A party that perceives the arbitration process as unfair is
unlikely to agree to engage the arbitration process in the future.
The benefits of arbitration - the expeditious, inexpensive, and often amicable
resolution of disputes - cannot be realized unless the parties contractually agree to
use the process. Parties are likely to do so only if they perceive the process as fair.
Permitting non-party discovery is an important component of guaranteeing that
parties to an arbitration agreement have the real and perceived ability to present their
case to an arbitrator.
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